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INTRODUCTION
In keeping with the theme of LatCrit XII, Critical Localities:  Epis-
temic Communities, Rooted Cosmopolitans, New Hegemonies and Know-
ledge Processes,1 the essays in this cluster critically explore gender, sexuali-
ty and location or “whereness”—the combination of physical and discursive 
space.  In introducing this cluster, I addresses the manner in which each 
essay examines the impact of gender and sexuality on whereness and vice 
versa.  My assertion is that gender and sexuality can be located (spotted or 
placed), dislocated (removed or displaced), and relocated (transferred or 
replaced) and in doing so, individuals, communities, identities, and locales 
may be transformed and that each author addresses some aspect of this 
transformation.  
In his essay, Gender, Place, Discursive Space:  Where is Same-Sex 
Marriage?,2 Marc R. Poirier states that “specific spaces and places” can be 
transformed by and through the performance of gender and sexuality, and 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law; L.L.M., University of 
Wisconsin Law School; J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., San Francisco State.   
1
 LatCrit XII, Twelfth Annual LatCrit Conference, Florida International University College of 
Law, Miami, Florida.  October 4-6, 2007. 
2
 Marc R. Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FIU L.
REV.  307 (2008). 
290 FIU Law Review [3:289
so too can the performance of gender and sexuality be transformed by and 
through the location in which they are performed.3  Though the following 
essays each tackle a different subject area and cover issues much broader 
than gender/sexuality and “whereness,” all employ a critical analysis to 
address both transformation of location by gender and sexuality and of 
gender/sexuality by location.  Each essay includes a focus on at least one 
institution—in the broadest sense of the word.  Marc R. Poirier examines 
the institution of marriage;4 Aziza Naa-Kaa Botchway examines “religion,” 
culture, and nations;5 Larry Catá Backer explores the United States gov-
ernment, focusing on the Presidency;6 and Diane J. Klein examines popular 
culture, specifically prime-time television.7  Common to these institutions is 
that each has its own “imperatives [and] patterns of subordination.”8  In this 
cluster introduction, I briefly explore the ways in which these four essays 
critically locate, dislocate and relocate gender and sexuality in both physi-
cal and discursive space within these institutions9 as I address the question, 
“where is ‘there’ for gender and sexuality?”  Each essay, in its own way, 
finds that for subordinated sexual and gender identities–lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, transgender (hereinafter LGBT) people and women–that question is 
answered at least once “not here,” even as the location of “here” varies.  
However, each essay also manages to find a positive location for those with 
subordinated genders and/or sexualities. 
I first consider Professor Poirier’s essay where he works in the context 
of LGBT identities to examine the physical and discursive spaces or lack 
thereof for same-sex marriage.10  I begin with this essay because Poirier 
helps in understanding the “whereness” that I assert all these essays ad-
dress.  Part II turns to Abolished by Law—Maintained in Practice:  The 
Trokosi as Practiced in Parts of the Republic of Ghana, where Aziza Naa-
Kaa Botchway addresses the specifically gendered practice of the Trokosi.11
Botchway explores the way in which the location, in this case within cul-
ture and religion, of a gendered practice—female sexual slavery—can allow 
its continuation even as it comes into conflict with national and internation-
3
 Id. at 309. 
4
 See id.
5
 See Aziza Naa-Kaa Botchway, Abolished by Law—Maintained in Practice:  The Trokosi as 
Practiced in Parts of the Republic of Ghana, 3 FIU L. REV. 369 (2008).  
6
 See Larry Catá Backer, Gendering the President Male:  Executive Authority Beyond Rule of 
Law Constitutionalism in the American Context, 3 FIU L. REV. 341 (2008). 
7
 See Diane J. Klein, Latino Masculinities Under The Microscope: Stereotyping and Counterste-
reotyping on Five Seasons of CSI: Miami, 3 FIU L. REV. 395 (2008). 
8
 Id. at 399. 
9
 See Poirier, supra note 2, at 311 (defining discursive space). 
10
 Id. at 311-17. 
11
 Botchway, supra note 5, at 369-70 (defining Trokosi as when “young virgin girls in Ghana who 
. . . become (sexual) slaves of a fetish priest as punishment for the alleged sins and/or crimes of a family 
member.”). 
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al law.  In Part III, I look at Larry Catá Backer’s work, Gendering the Pres-
ident Male:  Executive Authority Beyond Rule of Law Constitutionalism in 
the American Context.12  In critiquing Harvey Mansfield’s article, The Law 
and the President: In a National Emergency, Who You Gonna Call?,13 Pro-
fessor Backer works with the construction and performance of masculinity 
and femininity in the Presidency under rule of law constitutionalism and the 
differences when that performance is located in the domestic or private 
sphere versus the international or public sphere.14  In Part IV, I address how 
Professor Klein, in her article Latino Masculinities Under The Microscope: 
Stereotyping and Counterstereotyping on Five Seasons of CSI: Miami,
tackles the presentation of Latino identity on the network television show 
CSI: Miami.  She examines a “Latinoness” within the contexts of the crimi-
nal activity and law enforcement settings of the show itself and ultimately 
within Miami, Florida—the location of the LatCrit XII Conference that 
produced this symposium. 
This introduction concludes by noting that in each essay there is a cur-
rent of defiance against attempts to permanently dislocate gender and sex-
uality from discursive and physical spaces.  Each essay shows that efforts to 
dislocate these identities, and the subordinated people themselves, are inef-
fective because sexuality and/or gender manage to remain on location or to 
relocate elsewhere, even to places they are still not accepted.  In closing I 
state that “whereness” and sexuality and gender are vital aspects of LatCrit 
analysis, and thus each of these essays is an important part of this sympo-
sium. 
I. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: GROUNDING GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND 
WHERENESS
Marc Poirier’s essay discusses discursive and physical space in asking 
and answering the question “where is same-sex marriage?”  The question 
refers not only to the discussion about same-sex marriage, but specifically 
to where same-sex marriages can be performed.  The focus of this query is 
on whether particular sites and/or locations are or are not available for so-
lemnizing same-sex marriages.  Poirier also addresses how locations of 
sexuality performativity are limited and controlled by law and custom,15
12
 Backer, supra note 6. 
13
 Harvey Mansfield, The Law and the President: In a National Emergency, Who You Gonna 
Call?, 11 THE WKLY STANDARD (17) Jan. 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/563mevpm.asp (last visited Mar. 
22, 2008). 
14
 Backer, supra note 6, at 341, 346-62. 
15
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 311; see also Botchway, supra note 5, at 371 (discussing how law and 
custom control gender and sexuality by determining the fates of numerous women and girls). 
292 FIU Law Review [3:289
which speaks to a broader issue of where LGBT identities are “allowed” to 
be.   
As Poirier notes, discussing issues of gender and sexuality can make 
people uncomfortable, sparking a desire in some “not to have to go there,”16
meaning individuals prefer not to have to address any aspect of life that 
brings attention to sexuality in general and discrimination based on gender 
and sexuality in particular.  Poirier writes that when it comes to issues of 
gender and sexuality, “[T]he local and personal level is where change must 
ultimately occur, if a change is mandated via larger normative structures 
within our society, such as statutory or case law, is to take hold.”17  Essen-
tially, according to Poirier, it is individuals who must be changed in order to 
effect larger change.  This point brings to mind the question, “what is the 
change that must happen to these individuals?”  Though I do agree that in-
dividual change does effect larger change, I argue that it is also possible to 
change the gender and sexuality of a location and/or to relocate gender and 
sexuality themselves.  This locale change and/or relocation can in turn ef-
fect larger social change.  For example, those who move into or out of par-
ticular neighborhoods can alter their demographics and identity such that 
they become identified as “gay” neighborhoods when “enough” LGBT 
people move in and they lose that identity when “too many” LGBT people 
move out.18  I assert that the idea that gender and sexuality can be relocated, 
maybe to small town America, is what undergirds  some of the fears of 
same-sex marriage.  It is the notion that LGBT folk or same-sex relation-
ships will contaminate a particular locale and thus “traditional” marriages 
and the children they produce will be poisoned.  The idea is that, as Poirier 
discusses, the discursive space19 of, in this case, marriage is altered by a 
different performance of sex and gender in the physical space. 
According to Poirier, it is the “socially visible performances”20 of 
LGBT people, couples and families that alter the discursive space by relo-
cating LGBT identities into places where the LGBTness has been disal-
lowed or dislocated.  This raises the question of whether these “socially 
visible performances” must be localized or not.  In other words, are LGBT 
performances as individuals, couples, and parents different depending on 
the locale21 or institution22 —the “where” —and should they be?  If the an-
16
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 309. 
17
 Id. (citations omitted).  
18
 See, e.g., Patricia Leigh Brown, Gay Enclaves Face Prospect of Being Passé, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/us/30gay.html (last visited Mar. 22, 
2008) (discussing the Castro in San Francisco). 
19
 See Poirier, supra note 2, at 311. 
20
 Id. at 310. 
21
 By locale I mean “a place or locality, esp. with reference to events or circumstances connected 
with it.” Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/locale (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
22
 The institutions in this case are the Boy Scouts and a college. 
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swer is yes, then the burden is placed on the subordinated to change their 
sexuality or gender, or at least the performance of it, in order to be accepted 
within greater society.  But changing the performance undermines it and, 
even if the performance can be changed or is changed in one particular 
place, it appears that gender and sexuality cannot be actually dislocated.  
The Boy Scouts v. Dale case is an example of this.  Mr. Dale was not out 
when he was within “Boy Scout” space, yet he was excluded because his 
sexuality performance in a separate and less rigidly regulated space, at his 
college, was unacceptable to the Boy Scouts.23  Even if there are “daily mi-
croperformances”24 that are localized, one may not shed the identity itself —
thus, here gay, there gay, everywhere gay.  Subordinated groups are ex-
pected to perform differently depending on location, but yet even when the 
performance is altered, the subordinated identity/persons is/are still deemed 
to be unacceptable in that, as with Mr. Dale, once identity attaches one 
simply is, as in this case, gay, and the location of the gayness ceases to be 
the primary concern, dislocated by the gayness in and of itself.  It is still 
expected, however, that one will perform his or her subordinated identity 
differently based on where it is being performed, and there are some spaces 
where LGBT identity is banned altogether.  One of those spaces with an 
outright ban is marriage.25  Marriage simply is a dominant group—
heterosexual and cisgender26—space. 
Poirier goes on to explain why LGBT persons are problematic for tra-
ditionally dominant groups.  He writes: “I argue that same sex couples are 
troubling for traditionalists in part because their daily visible performances 
as couples fail to follow the structures and strictures of sexuality, gender 
and family that inhere in traditional marriage and that traditionalists view as 
central to the reproduction of social structures from one generation to the 
next.”27  The point is that it is simply LGBT existence that is the problem. 
The ‘failing to follow,’28 of which Poirier writes, may be some intentional 
act, but more often it is simply being out or outed.  This outness is both in 
the discursive and physical space, the cultural and geographic location. 
The discursive space and cultural locus of the institution of marriage is 
contentious, but so too is the actual physical space and geographic location 
where the marriages occur.  Until the push for legal and social recognition 
23
 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644-45 (2000). 
24
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 310-11, 325, 328. 
25
 There are several exceptions to the ban on same-sex marriage.  These exceptions as of this 
writing include the countries of Canada, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium and South Africa, and the 
states of Massachusetts, Connecticut and (though limited and under challenge at this time) California in 
the United States.  
26
 Julia Serano, WHIPPING GIRL: A TRANSSEXUAL WOMAN ON SEXISM AND THE SCAPEGOATING 
OF FEMININITY 33 (2007) (“People who are non-transgender may be described as being cisgender.”). 
27
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 311. 
28
 Id. 
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of lesbian and gay relationships, there was little if any consideration for the 
impact of same-sex marriages or gay weddings as they were private ar-
rangements and events, meaningful only to those involved.  There was no 
official recognition and thus no battle over meaning or impact within the 
law.  It was the onset of a national discourse on gay marriage that made 
same-sex relationship-celebratory ceremonies possibly dangerous to wider 
society, and thus, even those performed outside Massachusetts29 became 
problematic to the point that they needed to be quashed and/or the partici-
pants punished.30
LGBT identity has come to occupy a significant portion of discursive 
space, but also LGBT people have come to claim a larger part of physical 
space as well.  The issue of physical presence has been revealed as impor-
tant in court cases addressing the exclusion of LGBT persons or groups 
from institutions, organizations or events.31  At issue seems to be the literal 
presence of the homosexual body in a particular location.  As Poirier points 
out, in Dale “the Court repeatedly discusses the issue in terms of Dale’s 
‘presence’ in the organization, using the image of communicative ‘presence’ 
of the body no less than four times.”32  This indicates that there is no way to 
dislocate sexuality from body.33  If one knows of another’s sexual orienta-
tion, the individual has a communicative presence.  This is the premise un-
dergirding the policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”34  The idea is that if the 
military does not “know” then “it” (homosexuality) does not actually exist 
and the individual may remain in place.  However, if “it” is revealed then 
29
 See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (granting marriage rights 
to same-sex couples). 
30
 See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211 (11th Cir. 1997) (female plaintiff has job offer with-
drawn once employer learns of her plans for a same-sex wedding). 
31
 See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 640 (gay man excluded from the Boy Scouts); see also Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (LGBT organization ex-
cluded from marching in the Boston St. Patrick’s Day Parade); Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F.Supp. 859 (N.D. 
Ga. 1993) (lesbian attorney excluded from working for the Georgia Attorney General’s office). 
32
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 315 n.47 (quoting the following text from the Court’s opinion: “We 
must then determine whether Dale’s presence as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the 
boy scouts' desire to not ‘promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” Boy Scouts, 
530 U.S. at 656.  “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to 
send a message . . . .”  Id.  “[T]he presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely 
interfere with the Boy Scouts' choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.”  Id. at 654.  
According to Poirer, “Justice Stevens’ dissent is also quite clear that the majority’s opinion rests on 
communicative presence, not on the possibility that Dale might become an open advocate of gay causes 
at those time and places where he is being a Boy Scout.” (internal citations omitted)). 
33
 Other essays in this cluster indicate how gender and ethnicity also cannot be dislocated from 
the body.  See Botchway, supra note 5, at 380 (discussing women and girls who are sent into sexual 
slavery because they are women and girls); see also Klein, supra note 7, at 411-15 (discussing Eric 
Delko, the Latino CSI who is differentiated from white CSI’s through his dark skin especially as com-
pared to pale, redheaded CSI boss, Horatio Caine). 
34
 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1997) (policy essentially excluding out lesbian, gay and bisexuals from serv-
ing in the United States military). 
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the military “knows” and the individual service member must be removed.  
Though couched in “homosexual conduct”35 language, the “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” policy is firmly rooted in the need to dislocate the homosexual 
body from the military.  So too in Dale, as Poirier notes, “because Dale is 
an ‘avowed homosexual[,]’ his own body is already marked.  It conveys a 
message by its very ‘presence within the Boy Scouts.’”36
Location is part of law itself.  Issues such as jurisdiction, venue and 
which law controls in both national and international contexts are revealing.  
Each of the essays included here has the law itself with which to contend.  
Poirier, in addressing location as territory, geography, states or countries, 
discusses the concept of “whereness” of people versus whereness in real 
estate, ultimately determining that “[a] person’s whereness perhaps ought to 
have different consequences from real estate’s whereness.”37  Laws which 
control based on the territory in one which is located ultimately result in a 
patchwork of laws regulating morality.  
This leads to a question of whether all sexuality is local, meaning 
whether the morals of one locale, as determined by the dominant group, 
should control. Without addressing issues of morality (such as whether this 
is a legitimate area for governmental control or whether same-sex marriages 
that are valid in one jurisdiction ought to be valid in other jurisdictions bar-
ring public policies or laws to the contrary), the question arises whether 
jurisdictions with differing marriage rules are attempting to regulate what 
other states or jurisdictions can and cannot do with regard to same-sex mar-
riages.  States that choose to confer certain benefits or status on same-sex 
couples should be allowed to do so without being undermined by states that 
choose not to do so.  Poirier suggests that maybe the state that conferred the 
status should maintain jurisdiction over the couple, regardless of whether or 
not the pair are domiciled in the state.38  Domicile would not affect status, 
but merely the recognition of that status.39 Thus same-sex couples married 
in Massachusetts or Connecticut would still be married even if they moved 
to another state (even if their new state of residence would not permit them 
access to the same benefits granted to mixed-sex married couples).  But one 
aspect of the anti-same-sex marriage argument is that the presence of a legi-
timately-married-same-sex couple has a negative effect on mixed-sex mar-
ried couples.  The problem is that in some states same-sex marriage is 
viewed not as a “local public good,”40 but as a local public evil, and that 
35
 10 U.S.C. § 654(13) (1997) (“The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding 
element of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of military service.”). 
36
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 312 (internal citations omitted). 
37
 Id. at 322. 
38
 Id. at 318. 
39
 Id. at 321. 
40
 Id. at 324. 
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allowing same-sex spouses to even exist within the boundaries of a given 
state, it is argued, will have a horrible impact on the citizenry and the state 
as a whole.  Thus, states should be legally permitted to exclude or banish 
them from their midst.   
Poirier ventures into an area that Aziza Botchway41 addresses when he 
writes of what he refers to as the “aterritorial nomos approach.”42  Here the 
issue is one of culture and the accommodation of different cultures, ad-
dressing “cultural and moral pluralism.”43  Rather than on geographical 
whereness, the focus is on the commonality of a community’s culture.  The 
idea is that individuals can create accepting communities within specific 
locations that are aterritorial.44  These self-constructed communities would 
have spiritual or moral jurisdiction over such issues as whether or not to 
permit same-sex marriage. When/if there is conflict within those communi-
ties or locales an individual or group could choose to leave for friendlier 
climes.45  Choosing to leave is a self-dislocation whereas banishment, such 
as what happens to the Trokosi,46 is dislocation by other members of the 
community.  Poirier discusses dislocation by both the self and others.  Bot-
chway discusses the banishment of girls and women, a gender dislocation 
of girls from home to away, never to return.47 Larry Catá Backer discusses a 
kind of dislocation by external forces when he writes about intragender 
policing of masculinity where men regulate the masculinity of other men 
and dislocate aspects that do not comport or banish men who do not con-
form. 48   And Diane Klein discusses a dislocation of Latino masculinity, 
especially in the context of Cuban identity, by other Latino identities and 
constructs of masculinity.49   
There are specific dislocations from place, but also from discursive 
space; however, if gender and sexuality were tied not to place but to cultur-
al community, it would appear that dislocations would be limited.  One 
could choose to leave the community, go “straight” as it were; however, this 
would be voluntary dislocation, not banishment.  Also, as Poirier points out 
that, by participating in one discursive space or another, we can have differ-
ent forms of marriage that coexist within a territorial jurisdiction.50
Another option for dislocation and relocation of discursive spaces, 
such as marriage, is to dislocate it from the law and relocate it to a more 
41
 Botchway, supra note 5, at 369. 
42
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 325-28. 
43
 Poirier, supra note 2 at 325. 
44
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 326 (using religious communities as an example). 
45
 Poirier, supra note 2. at 326-27. 
46
 Botchway, supra note 5, at 370-71. 
47
 Botchway, supra note 5, at 391. 
48
 Backer, supra note 6, at 341. 
49
 Klein, supra note 7, at 395. 
50 See Poirier, supra note 2. 
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comfortable place.  For example, marriage could be relocated to where reli-
gion lies.  Still, there is the question of physical space.  Where weddings are 
performed is an issue for locations, for geographies, for territories.  And the 
result of the marrying that people do is still a part of the discursive space.  
The issue in Shahar51 was that she located herself as married outside of the 
safe discursive space of her community, the locale with moral jurisdiction.  
In that public discursive space she and her marriage were rejected.  But in 
Shahar there was an issue of physical space as well in that there was to be a 
wedding.  It is actual public space, the physical location for the marriage 
ceremony—the wedding itself—that Poirier addresses when writing about 
the Ocean Grove, New Jersey case.52  A wedding needs a physical place, 
and therefore gender and sexuality are being performed in public through 
the rite of marrying.  Marrying is a public act; the wedding is the stage on 
which that act is performed.  The where of the wedding indicates the validi-
ty, or lack thereof, of the marriage.  As Poirier concludes, “in seeking to 
attain the normalizing status of marriage, they nevertheless do it differently 
and so redefine it.  Whether this reaffirms or significantly undermines the 
underlying, traditional, gendered structure of the institution remains to be 
seen.”
53
 Changing marriage in particular, and gender and sexuality in gener-
al—the process of locating, dislocating and relocating marriage, gender and 
sexuality—possibly has the impact of lessening dominant group power 
while showing potentially great positives for subordinated groups and so-
ciety as a whole.   
II. TROKOSI: CULTURAL/RELIGIOUS LOCATIONS OF FEMALE SEXUAL 
SLAVERY
Aziza Botchway’s essay focuses primarily on Ghana as the location 
for the practice of the Trokosi, which Botchway states “describe[s] both the 
practice [of female sexual slavery] and the virgin female forced to serve the 
priest involved in the practice.”54  Here the issue is that the Trokosi, though 
violative of national and international law, is justified by culture and reli-
gion.  The place and position of women is circumscribed by geographic 
location, in this article the focus is on Ghana; the physical spaces, which are 
the temples in which girls and women are enslaved; and the discursive 
space of domestic and international law as it interacts with culture and reli-
gion in determining women’s lives.   
51
 Shahar, 836 F.Supp. at 859. 
52
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 329-30.  
53
 Id. at 335. 
54
 Botchway, supra note 5, at 371. 
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The “fetish priest [ ] is the proxy for the gods”55 and the Trokosi can be 
something with which to bargain for a family or village experiencing bad 
luck or they can be used to serve out the sentence of a man convicted of a 
crime.56  When a deal is struck, the girl or woman is dislocated from her 
home and relocated to the temple.  Her gender and gender role are dislo-
cated as she is transformed from being a girl, woman, and daughter into 
slave and wife, “married” off to the fetish priest in order to bring good luck 
or as penance for a crime that may not have been committed at all.57  As 
Botchway notes, the child may even be relocated far away from home such 
that, if she were ever freed, she would be a stranger in a strange village.58
Regardless of location she is still an outcast.59
In the discursive space of Ghanaian law, women and girls are “not 
overtly discriminated against.”60  The law also asserts protection for human 
rights as well as special protection for children.61  Ghana is also a signatory 
to, and has ratified several international human rights treaties, which the 
Trokosi contravenes.62  In both the domestic and international spheres, 
Ghanaian girls and women should be protected against sexual enslavement 
that is the Trokosi.  But the argument asserted by those in support of the 
continuation of the Trokosi is that it is a religious and cultural practice that 
is and should continue to be protected as such. 
Botchway asserts that the Trokosi is located within the religious and 
cultural practices of Ghana as opposed to located within the boundaries of 
international human rights anti-discrimination laws.63  Thus the fates of 
women and girls are determined by cultural relativism, and they are 
doomed to be sent off to be sexual slaves.  Even though laws exist that can 
and should protect women and girls, their intent and reality are dislocated 
from each other.  The intent of treaties and conventions may be to provide 
women lives free from slavery,64 however the reality is that they may not be 
“worth the paper [they are] printed on”65 if they cannot in reality prevent 
women from being discriminated against and bartered into sexual slavery. 
Like Poirier, Botchway asserts that the change must take place at the 
local level.  What must occur is that villages must begin to dislocate their 
fates from the gender enslavement of women.  Botchway suggests that 
55
 Id. at 372 (footnote omitted).  
56
 Id. at 373. 
57
 Id.
58
 Id. at 369. 
59
 Id.
60
 Botchway, supra note 5, at 378. 
61
 Id. at 386-90. 
62
 Id.
63
 Id. at 390-91. 
64
 Id. at 392. 
65
 Id.
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Ghana should “(1) begin with parental education, (2) provide support 
groups for these women and (3) punish the priests.”66  These suggestions 
each serve to dislocate the constructed roles for girls and women in places 
that practice the Trokosi from the economic and legal troubles that individ-
uals and communities face and to relocate girls and women under the rule 
of law, domestic and international.  In practical terms, women and girls may 
need to be relocated into actual geographic locales where they are not 
forced into sexual slavery or can successfully escape if coerced or forced 
into the practice. 
III. THE PRESIDENCY:
LOCATING GENDER IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND HOMELAND (SECURITY)
Professor Larry Catá Backer tackles the issue of gender in the context 
of the rule of law and the U.S. Presidency.67  This work both responds to an 
essay by Harvey Mansfield titled, The Law and the President: In a National 
Emergency, Who You Gonna Call?,68 and expands on the issue of gender in 
the Presidency.  The location for the construction of gender is in the context 
of domestic versus international arenas or the private versus the public 
sphere.  Backer makes the argument that “Mansfield suggests that Presiden-
tial power—gendered male—clearly suggests that the President’s Constitu-
tional powers extend beyond the mere execution of the laws.”69  Backer 
writes, “[i]f law is male, . . . then rule of law is defectively male (and thus 
subordinate as female)—passive, docile, and risk averse.”70  The physical 
location for this discussion is in the “post 9-11” United States, however, the 
gendering of the Presidency and the argument that presidential powers are 
not bound by “rule of law” or “rule of law constitutionalism” is not limited 
to the early twenty-first century.71
Backer addresses the location of ideologies in noting that it is “well 
understood in the West” that ideologies have “power . . . to discipline and 
subordinate women” directly as well as through “defining, disciplining and 
subordinating the ‘female’ in men.”72  These ideologies are located most 
broadly in “the west,” more narrowly within the “American government” 
and specifically, the Presidency.73  They are also located within a discursive 
space bounded by law in general and, specifically, by the U.S. Constitu-
tion.74  According to Backer, in Mansfield’s essay it is “rule of law constitu-
66
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tionalism” that works to essentially gender the “'true' constitutional frame-
work envisioned by the Founders” as female, and thus it is rendered both 
defective and ineffective especially when it comes to keeping America safe 
in an international context.75  Mansfield uses this idea of the Presidency, 
which is constructed as male, being feminized by rule of law constitutional-
ism to explain why there is a constitutionalism that actually demands that 
the President “act beyond law under certain circumstances.”76  Thus, for 
Mansfield there is a location that is beyond the law and that location is at 
least masculine, if not fully male, space.  It is a location that is in the public 
sphere, concerned with protecting the nation from the international “evil 
doers” hell bent on doing harm to the United States.77  Backer points out 
that this is the traditional man’s role as savior and protector.  The location 
of the rule of law that is legitimately female is within the domestic sphere, 
where women have always belonged. 
In her essay, Botchway locates gender and gendering squarely within 
one specific cultural context while Backer writes of a gendering which is 
“trans-cultural.”78  Regardless whether one or many, the communities (loca-
tions), geographic and otherwise, are places and spaces that construct gend-
er and control gendering. Gender is located within institutional systems of 
power.  The power of gender constructions and performances to subordinate 
is partially determined by the location of the subordination—where it is 
working.  Backer notes that the subordination of women is located in both 
the public and private spheres and is accomplished directly and indirectly 
by subordinating women as women and women as not men.79
It is the ascription of certain traits to certain genders in certain loca-
tions that makes for the gendering of, in this case, the Presidency, the Presi-
dent, and his actions.  This gendering is accomplished by constructing cer-
tain traits and certain behaviors as feminine.  They are constructed as femi-
nine partially because of where they are performed, in this case the locating 
of actions within the domestic sphere and under the rule of law.  By adher-
ing to the rule of law the action becomes female.  It is extra-legal actions 
that are male.  As Backer writes, “It comes as no surprise, then, that male 
elites in the United States, like those in other nations, continue to protect 
the male gender borderlands of behavior norms.  And there is no more po-
werful set of behavior norms than law in the United States.”80  Law is loca-
75
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tion in and of itself.  What the legal system does is to relocate those who are 
behaving counter to the law back within its purview.  Fundamentally, the 
location issue is that there is a difference between the private and public 
spheres.  The private is domestic and the public international.  The domestic 
is feminine and the public masculine.  That public space is male space and 
is beyond law.  Mansfield’s unitary executive is beyond even the rule of law 
because he is located outside the law and it is only a “He” who is able to be 
located beyond the law.  A “She” is always located within legal bounds be-
cause she is a she.   
Mansfield, and Backer in critiquing him, both invoke other locations 
such as a “well ordered governmental house” which has a gendered aspect 
to it in the sense that a house is a domestic space and that is women’s 
space.81  The question is does the White House make the man?  This house 
has: 
functional differentiation[s] inherent in separation of powers [which 
are] both necessary and natural given the characteristics of each of the 
elements of government—a domestic and rule bound legislature, and 
judiciary—in contradistinction to the assertive and unbound protective 
power of the executive.  Constitutionalism merely institutionalizes and 
assimilates these natural distinctions.82
In this case the female/feminine, male/masculine distinctions are natu-
ral.  The legislature and judiciary are domestic, rule bound and feminine, 
and the executive is protective, public, extra-legal, and masculine.83
But it is not only the branches of government that are spatially gender 
limited, so too is the Constitution itself.  Says Backer, “Rule-of-law consti-
tutionalism is female space and, for Mansfield, insufficient. He tells the 
reader: ‘[y]et the rule of law is not enough to run a government,’84 and it 
was government that the Constitution created.”85  According to Mansfield, 
government needs to be located within the law and to be able to relocate 
outside it.  That which is within it is subordinate to that which is outside it.  
There is a gendered hierarchy:  public/international/extra-legal presidential 
and dominant, and private/domestic/rule of law legislative/judicial and sub-
ordinate.  The law itself is feminine and discretion is masculine.86  The se-
paration of powers has a location and, again, it is the domestic and feminine 
sphere versus the public and masculine sphere.   
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For the executive not to have extra-legal or “extra-legislative” power87
is to weaken him, thus creating an effeminate and hen-pecked executive.  
The Presidency is male and must be understood as such.  The President 
must be understood as male because of the location of the extra-legal as-
pects of the law.  It is in the public sphere, the job is that of protector of 
both the public and the domestic sphere, not the controller of the private 
sphere, and it is according to the Constitution that this is the way it is.  
Mansfield asserts that the president cannot be located under the rule of law 
because, according to Backer, “the rule-of-law cannot apply when law does 
not apply.”88  There is a space within American constitutionalism, Mansfield 
argues, “when liberties are dangerous and law does not apply.”89  “Lawless-
ness of this sort is both moral and lawful, precisely because it rejects the 
weakness and stability [read femininity] of rule-of-law constitutionalism.”90
It is the male’s responsibility to protect the home.  It is the President’s re-
sponsibility to protect the homeland.  Thus, the Presidency itself is mascu-
line space.  In closing, Backer sums up Mansfield’s argument and explains 
why the Presidency is thus gendered male.  “If law is male, Mansfield sug-
gests, then rule-of-law is defectively male (and thus subordinate as fe-
male)—passive, docile, and risk-averse.”91  The result, Backer argues, is 
that the Presidency becomes “corroded”92 and transformed into a form of 
dictatorship. 
[B]y imposing and enforcing these differences, differences based on a 
need to distinguish male from female behavior—more from less valued—
Mansfield’s exercise in “manliness” is symptomatic of the more subtle and 
corroding subversive nature of the hierarchy of male gendering. Intra-
sexual gender role hierarchies, based on a normative model of male role 
supremacy, continue to marginalize the normatively female, both within 
each sex and between the sexes.  When this marginalization becomes the 
stuff of constitutional analysis, “caudillismo cannot be too far behind.”93
Backer does end by noting, “The gendered legal order still survives in-
tact.”94  However, it is the “traditional binary,” not Mansfield’s inverted one, 
“which genders rule of law as male, and the domestic portion of the private 
sphere, female and thus extra-legal” that survives.95  Under the traditional 
gender binary, the unregulated space that is extra legal is female space, not 
male space.  It is extra-legal not because of a superiority, but because it is 
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not worthy of the attention of the State.  The masculine space of the unitary 
executive warrants attention and should be located where it will receive 
much scrutiny.   
IV. ON TELEVISION: (RE)(DIS)LOCATING LATINOS IN (CSI) MIAMI
Diane Klein begins her essay by locating it firmly within the LatCrit 
arena by invoking LatCrit V,96 and situating this work within the cultural 
studies arena addressed by “many LatCrit scholars.”97  It is, according to 
Klein, the LatCrit way to be democratic even in the cultural realm because 
like culture studies, LatCrit “rejects the distinction between so-called low 
culture and high culture and argues that all forms of culture need to be stu-
died in relation to a given social formation.”98  In this case, Klein is examin-
ing CSI: Miami as a cultural phenomenon that presents and represents Lati-
nos.   Her work is a response to the call put out by Professor Perry to “inter-
rogate the cultural narratives that reinforce and perpetuate racial biased 
workplace situations.”99  Klein examines two workplaces, the workplace of 
the show itself and what it represents, as well as the police station and fo-
rensic laboratory, workplaces within the show.  Similar to the other articles 
in this cluster, Klein addresses the cultural narratives that shape gender and 
sexuality.  Here, the cultural narrative tells of Latinos/as on television as 
both actors and characters, and the stereotyping and sometimes counter- 
stereotyping that occurs.   
Klein’s essay explores multiple locations:  the workplace of the televi-
sion production, Miami—the locale of the show itself—and the presentation 
of the fictionalized workplace, as well as fictionalized Miami.  There are 
also personal locations/locales.  Gender and sexuality themselves are loca-
tions with the actual meaning of where a person “is” at the time, as in where 
they would be placed or place themselves on sexuality or gender continua, 
such as the Kinsey scale.100  There is also the issue of the influence of geo-
graphic locale on gender and sexuality as well as the influence of other 
identities. Klein’s focus is on “institutional, rather than psychological 
sources of racism and discrimination.”101
Klein examines five seasons of CSI: Miami, constructing an elaborate 
coding system to address the issue of stereotyping.  She notes different ma-
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jor themes specifically, finding a running theme of masculinity and crimi-
nality expressed primarily through the Latino characters including Eric 
Delko, the one Latino CSI.  Though the white male CSIs also break the 
rules, it seems that rarely do they break the law, whereas Delko does.  Lati-
nos are also portrayed as the “Latin lovers.”  This, too, includes Eric Delko.   
Locales are conflated when it comes to the Latinos in CSI: Miami.
Klein points out that rarely are the locales from whence the Latinos come 
differentiated from the others.  Though occasionally one does note a real or 
fictionalized Latin American country a character may come from, generally 
there is a sense of Pan-Latinoness about the characters and the storylines.  It 
is as if differentiating between and among the individuals would take too 
much research and, thus, all Latinos are lumped together as one identity. 
Though often lumped together geographically as well as stereotypical-
ly, there is the case of what Klein explains102 and Lolita Inniss identifies as 
the “exemplary other.”103  Klein identifies that the exemplary other is based 
on stereotyping, explaining that: “The construction of certain members of a 
group as ‘exemplary others’ is a subordinating technique.  It co-opts those it 
identifies as ‘exemplary,’ and does so by enforcing their differences from 
other members of the subordinated group.”104  Stereotyping can locate iden-
tities in the camp of “other” or “exemplary other” both of which are re-
moved from the one who is the standard by which the “others” are judged.  
The question for CSI: Miami is whether Eric Delko is simply “other” or 
“exemplary other.”  Given that the context is Miami, which has a very high 
Cuban population, having a Cuban, non-Anglo man working in law en-
forcement as a CSI might not be uncommon.  However Delko may be an 
exemplary other, an extra special Cuban Man, not like the “simply” others. 
It is also possible that the Eric Delko is an example of racialized gend-
er or gendered racial counter stereotyping when taken as a three-
dimensional character.  He is generally located “outside the dominant ste-
reotypes of criminality and hypersexuality”105 and, for the most part, passes 
the “‘stereotype commutation’ test,”106 in that the character of Eric Delko 
did not have to be Latino, though it may have been odd to have an office 
located in Miami and not have a Cuban character.   
Klein also addresses class and location by specifically analyzing “La-
tinos in Upper Class Racially-Mixed Neighborhoods.”107  All identities—
race, class, ethnicity, gender and sexuality—have locational aspects.  Klein 
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concludes that CSI: Miami has managed to de-Latinize or to Anglicize a 
very Latino/a location/geography—the city of Miami—dislocating a dis-
tinctly Latino, particularly Cuban, identity.  Also CSI: Miami both dislo-
cates and relocates Latino sexuality within and without the workplace and 
within and without Miami, both the real and the fictionalized place. 
CONCLUSION
These four essays call attention to the notion that physical space, as in 
actual locations, can be both normative and normalizing.  Where one per-
forms one’s gender/sexuality can indicate that a certain level of normality is 
attached to that identity.  Certain aspects of Cuban masculinity may be 
identified as normal in Miami but may be considered less normal else-
where.  It is generally considered normal to have sex in private and abnor-
mal or deviant to have sex in public.  Marrying within a church can normal-
ize same-sex relationships in a way that legal sanctioning does not.  The 
idea is that there are proper or socially-sanctioned places to perform identi-
ty and improper ones.  The proper/improper dichotomy is as socially con-
structed as gender and sexuality itself, and, as the essays point out, can 
serve to harm subordinated identities.  Some identities are considered to 
have no proper social location, as with LGBT identities, and with others, 
the Trokosi for example, the proper location is a deadly one. 
As the essays indicate, subordinated people and identities continue to 
search for and create places to perform their sexuality and gender and to 
live their lives.  LGBT persons will be a part of marriage and the marriage 
debate.  Women are a part of international human rights law and will con-
tinue to work to implement laws within Ghana and other areas practicing 
Trokosi until they are relocated physically and discursively to a place of 
safety.  The feminine, even if stereotypically defined as domestic, cannot be 
excluded from the Presidency because it is through and against the female 
and thus femininity that males and masculinity are constructed and defined.  
There is no masculine without the feminine and thus the Presidential space 
already and always includes the female.  Finally, regardless of whether La-
tino masculinity is stereotyped or counter-stereotyped, locating CSI: Miami
in Miami is to be in Latino space.  It is one place where Latinos simply are 
and, to paraphrase Patricia Williams, the presence of Latinos within, as op-
posed to without, the bell jar of a “real” or “fictionalized” (CSI) Miami 
changes the dynamic forever.108
As Diane Klein notes, studying all levels of culture is an aspect of 
LatCrit scholarship.109  Location or “whereness,”110 which includes both 
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physical and discursive space, is part of cultural analysis.  Each of these 
essays shows the importance of gender and sexual whereness in the con-
struction of law and culture.  Klein’s essay raises the specific question of 
locale—the geography itself, the actual there that is there—fictionally con-
structed or not and its effect on gender and sexuality.  I was inspired by 
Klein’s article to ask the question:  Is gender and/or sexuality different in 
different locales?  All four essays lead me to answer “yes”.  What I mean is 
that the actual place itself does have an effect on gender and sexuality and 
vice versa.  I assert that there is an argument to be made that weather, tem-
perature, topography, architecture, etcetera—the specifics of locale—do 
construct and/or affect the performance of gender or sexuality, and the per-
formance of gender and sexuality effect the actual places themselves.  
These essays only touch on this in a limited manner thus leaving work for 
other LatCrit scholars to further address gender, sexuality, and critical local-
ities and to posit more answers to the question, “Where is there?” 
